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Diversification and Firm Performance in the Food Economy 
 
 
The food economy is an important and unique part of the US economy (Kinsey).  The 
performance of the food economy and the firms that operate in it are regularly described 
by widely read publications such as Business Week, Fortune, and Forbes.  Food economy 
firms are uniquely different relative to other businesses.  Sonka and Hudson identified the 
following five factors that make the food economy unique from other industries: the 
uniqueness of food for political and cultural reasons; uncertainty arising from the 
underlying biologic basis of crop and livestock production; the level of political 
intervention; institutional arrangements that place significant portions of the technology 
development process in the public sector; and differing competitive structures existing in 
the food economy.
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  Many food economy firms are widely diversified.  Various explanations have 
been offered for this diversification.  Many supply chains handling agricultural 
commodities have similar marketing, transportation, and processing characteristics which 
create economies of scope and leads to related diversification.  Processors with consumer 
food brands may seek to extend their branding to other related and unrelated food 
products. For example, Cotterill notes that food retailers may be able to achieve 
economies of scope in establishing a retail brand. Lubatkin et al. analyzed three 
horizontal mergers in the food processing industry and found that economies of scope in 
marketing might help explain recent diversification efforts.   
Our objective is to analyze the value of diversification in the food economy and 
it’s four distinct sectors; food processing, wholesale grocery, retail supermarket, and 
restaurant.
2  Prior research analyzing the value of diversification has focused on the US   3
economy as a whole and has suggested that diversified firms are valued at a discount 
compared to single-segment firms.  This study addresses the value of diversification with 
a more narrow focus, the food economy, rather than the entire economy as in previous 
research.   
 
Overview of Diversification and Firm Value Literature 
 
Theoretical arguments suggest that diversification can have both positive and negative 
effects on firm value.  In general, the earlier research (prior to 1980) focused on the 
benefits of diversification while the most recent (post 1980) literature addresses the costs 
of diversification. 
 
Potential Benefits of Diversification 
 
Gains from diversification may arise from various sources.  Economies of scope and 
managerial economies of scale can provide gains from diversification (Chandler).  
Wernerfelt and Montgomery suggest that firm-specific resources can be utilized in 
multiple industries and contribute to gains from diversification.   
Another theoretical argument for diversification relates to capital markets and 
resource allocation.  The desire by firms to diversify and form internal capital markets 
reflects the idea that information held by managers of firms and the external capital 
market is asymmetric.  Managers of firms have information advantages over the external 
capital market and therefore internal capital markets of diversified firms allocate 
resources more efficiently than external capital markets (Williamson, Stein).  Weston 
suggests that internal capital markets of diversified firms are more efficient than external 
capital markets.  Stulz extended this argument with the concept that diversified firms   4
create larger internal capital markets and reduce the problem of underinvestment.  
According to this argument, segments of diversified companies invest in more positive 
net present value opportunities than comparable single segment firms.      
Managers may have incentives to diversify and increase firm size even if it 
reduces shareholder wealth.  Management motivation for mergers include risk reduction 
(Amihud and Lev), greater power and prestige (Jensen and Stulz), and managerial 
compensation (Jensen and Murphy).  Diversification reduces risk of a manager’s 
portfolio when multiple segments of a firm have imperfectly correlated earnings 
(Lewellen).  In addition managerial compensation tends on average to be positively 
correlated with firm size, providing managers an incentive to increase firm size through 
diversification (Jensen and Murphy). 
 
Potential Costs of Diversification 
The literature also suggests that diversification may reduce shareholder wealth.  
Diversification can lead to inefficient cross-subsidization of poor performing business 
segments by profitable divisions within the same firm (Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts).  
Jensen argues that an unprofitable business segment which is part a diversified firm 
invests in more negative net present value projects than their segments likely would as 
independent firms.  Diversified firms have information asymmetry between corporate and 
division management creating higher administrative costs for diversified firms as 
compared to single segment firms (Harris, Kreibel, and Ravis; Myerson). 
 
Related and Unrelated Diversification 
   5
Prior research has also shown that the effect of diversification on firm value depends on 
the type of diversification (Rumelt; Christensen and Montgomery; and Palepu).  
Diversification is related if it involves business segments that 1) are components of the 
same supply chain (vertical coordination), 2) supply similar markets, 3) use similar 
distribution systems, 4) posses similar production technologies, or 5) engage in similar 
research and development (Salter and Weinhold).  Results from prior studies have shown 
that firms that are diversified into related businesses were usually more profitable than 
other firms (Christensen and Montgomery; Palepu; and Rumelt). Economies of scope 
may exist in some industries that allow firms to gain from diversifying in related 
activities as opposed to unrelated activities.  Diversification in related activities has a 
larger positive effect on firm value than unrelated diversification since human capital and 
other resources (economies of scope) can be used in related markets.   
Similarly, a high quality reputation and branding in one market may be carried 
over to another related market which provides positive net benefits to the firm (Nayyar).  
For example, Starbucks Corporation buys roasts whole bean coffees and sells them along 
with rich, specialty coffees, pastries and confections, and coffee-related accessories and 
equipment through company-operated retail stores.  It also sells premium coffee beans 
through other channels of distribution, including coffee distributors, hotels, retailers, 
warehouse clubs, and restaurants; which are collectively called Specialty Operations.  
Starbucks has essentially exploited economies of scope, managerial economies of scale, 
and its reputation for delivering high quality premium coffee in their retail stores to 
expand sales in their Specialty Operations.  Product characteristics, industry organization,   6
and market structure may therefore affect the ability of firms to add value through 




Our analysis of the effects of diversification on firm value is based on a measure of 
excess value for both single segment and multi-segment firms.  In our measure of excess 
value we use the ratio of actual value of a firm to its imputed value.  We follow Berger 
and Ofek and model excess value (EXV) as: 
(1)  EXV=ln(MV/IV), 
where ln is the logarithmic operator, MV is the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of debt, and IV represents the sum of the imputed values for each individual 
business segment (herein after referred to as segment).  For our study, a segment is 
defined as the portion of a company’s operations that are reported under a single four-
digit US Department of Commerce Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry 
code. A firm may have operations in multiple industries and therefore report results for 
more than one segment.
3  The sum of the imputed values of a firm are derived using the 
industry multiplier approach as developed by Berger and Ofek.  We multiply the segment 
assets of each firm by the median market value of equity plus the book value of debt-to-
asset ratio of single segment firms within the same industry (same four-digit SIC code).  
The sum of all the imputed values of a multi-segment firm is the imputed value of the 
entire firm as if each segment is operating as a stand-alone business. If MV is greater than 
IV then excess value is positive (negative) and the market perceives the value of the firm 
to be greater (less)  than the sum of the imputed value of its individual segments.  Using   7
the same methodology, in addition to using assets as a multiplier we also use total sales to 
compute EXV for each firm.   
  We investigate the effects of diversification on firm value using three different 
models.  Model 1 investigates the effects of diversification on excess value while 
controlling for firm characteristics which follows directly from Berger and Ofek.  Model 
2 is a modification of Model 1 where year binary variables and additional firm 
characteristics are added; and the effects of diversification and firm characteristics are 
allowed to vary by sector.  A third (Self-selection) model is developed which is a 
modification of Model 2 by treating the decision to diversify as endogenous rather than 
exogenous. 
 
Model 1: Benchmark Model with Diversification Measured Exogenously  
 
First we estimate firm excess value using Berger and Ofek’s model: 
(2)  ,0 1 ,2 , , it it it it EXV Y X e β ββ =+ + +, 
where EXVi,t is the excess value of firm i in year t; Xi,t is a set of firm characteristics; Yi,t 
is a binary variable equal to one if firm i in year t is diversified, 0 otherwise; 
01 2 , ,  and  β ββ  are parameters to be estimated; and  , it e  is the error term. The set of firm 
characteristics are those used by Berger and Ofek and include the natural log of total 
assets, earnings before interest and taxes divided by total sales, and capital expenditures 
divided by sales.   
In this model we analyze how the level of firm value varies with firm structure 
(Yi,t), while controlling for size, profitability, and capital expenditures.  We assume 
diversification is exogenous to the firm which provides a benchmark for comparing 
results with differences in estimates due to differences in data sets.  This model or   8
variations of it have been used by Campa and Kedia; Denis, Denis, and Yost; and Mansi 
and Reeb. 
 
Model 2: Diversification Measured Exogenously with Firm and Diversification Effects 
Varying by Sector  
 
We develop a second model which is a modification of the previous model by first 
adding additional variables to the set of firm characteristics, a set of sector binary 
variables for diversified firms rather than just one diversified variable, and a set of year 
dummy variables.  In the set of firm characteristics we include a measure for leverage and 
a quadratic term for size which results in the following model: 
(3)  ,, ,0 1 2 , ,, , it it it j it t it it EXV Y IND X YR β ββ δ η =+ + + +  
where INDi,t is a binary variable equal to one if firm i in year t is in sector j, for j=1 to 4 
(i.e., processing, wholesale, retail, restaurant), 0 otherwise; YRi,t is a binary variable equal 
to one if firm i is in year t, 0 otherwise; 01 2 , ,   and  j t β ββ δ , are parameters to be 
estimated;  , it η  is the error term; and all other variables are as previously specified.   
We use total debt divided by assets as a measure of leverage.  According to 
finance theory, leverage has a negative effect on firm value, therefore we hypothesize 
that the parameters on leverage to be negative.  We include a quadratic size term since 
this effect may be nonlinear due to decreasing marginal returns.  We also hypothesize 
that the effect of diversification on excess firm value varies by sector.  The parameter 
1, j β  provides a measure of the effect of diversification on firm value that can vary by 
sector.  For example in this model, a diversified firm within the processing sector may 
have larger positive diversification effects due to greater opportunities for economies of 
scope as compared to the wholesale, retail, and restaurant sectors.  Specifically, food   9
processors may have engaged in horizontal mergers during the 1980s to ensure and 
enhance their performance and value in reaction to the increasing consolidation in the 
food retailing industry (Connor and Geithman).   
Lang and Stulz have shown that industry effects explain part of the discount of 
diversified firms.  We use two digit SIC codes to assign firms to one of four sectors; 
processing (SIC 20), wholesale (SIC 51), retail (SIC 54), and restaurant (SIC 58).  We 
use the term sector rather than industry to measure industry effects.  For example, the 
processing sector contains numerous food processing industries which are defined as four 
digit SIC codes.  Firms with segments in different sectors are assigned to the sector which 
makes up the largest portion of their sales.  The year dummy variables measure the effect 
of macroeconomic conditions and the business cycle on the excess value of a firm. 
  We further expand the model specified in equation (3) to consider that the effects 
of size, profitability, capital expenditure divided by sales, and leverage on excess firm 
value may vary by sector which results in the following Model 2.  
(4)   ,0 1 , ,2 , , ,, , it j it it j it it t it it EXV Y IND IND X YR β ββδ υ =+ + + +  
where 1j β and  2 j β  varies by sector;  , it υ  is the error term, and all other variables are as 
previously specified.  The parameters on the set of firm characteristics are now specific to 
a sector.  For example, this specification allows for the size effect to vary by sector, so 
the size effect may be larger for the processing sector as compared to the restaurant 
sector.  The food processing sector has more industries (defined by 4 digit SIC codes) 
that are similar and use similar supply chains as compared to the restaurant sector.   
  
Model 3: Diversification Measured Endogenously with Firm and Diversification Effects 
Varying by Sector  
   10
In our third model, we treat the decision to diversify as endogenous rather than 
exogenous and control for the self-selection of firms that diversify using Heckman’s two-
stage procedure.
4  This self-selection model takes into account firm characteristics that 
both lead firms to diversify and affect firm value.  Prior research has show that firm and 
industry characteristics influence a firm’s decision to diversify (Maksimovic and Phillips; 
Lang and Stulz).  
In the first step we estimate a firm’s decision to diversify as a function of firm, 
industry, and macroeconomic conditions: 
(5)  , i,t , * , w it it u Y α =+  
(6)  ,, * 1 if   0, 0 otherwise, it it YY =>   
where Yi,t
* is not observed, wi,t, is a set of industry and firm characteristics that affect a 
firm’s decision to diversify, α represents a vector of parameters to be estimated,  and ui,t 
is the error term. We assume that  , it e  (equation 2) and  , it u  have a bivariate normal 
distribution with zero means, correlationρ , and standard deviation ε σ .  To model excess 
value for firms who choose to diversify we use:  
(7)  ,, 01 , 2 , 1, [| 1 ] ( ) it it it it it E EXV Y Y X w ε β ββ ρα σλ == + + + ,  















;  (.) and  (.)  φ Φ are, respectively, the 
density and cumulative distribution functions of a standard normal variable; and 
0,  1,   2 and  β ββ are parameters to be estimated.  The last term in equation (5) is the 
expected value of the error term in equation (3),  ,, (| 1 ) it it EY η = .  For firms who do not 
diversify, the excess value is modeled by: 
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This difference is what is estimated by the least squares parameter on the segment binary 
variable in equation (2).  Therefore least squares overestimates (underestimates) the 
effect of being diversified on the excess value of a firm if ρ is positive (negative).    
  In the first step of Heckman’s two-step procedure using the entire sample we 
estimate equation (5) with a probit model to obtain estimates of α and compute  , ˆit λ  for 
each observation.  Then we estimate the excess value of a firm using the following 
model: 
(10)  ,, ,0 1 ,2 , 1 , 2 , , [( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ] it it it it it it it it EXV Y X Y Y ε β ββ ρ λ α λ α ζ σ =+ + + + − + ,  
which simplifies to 
(11)  ,0 1 ,2 , ,, it it it it it EXV Y X Bλ β ββ λ ζ =+ + + + , 
where  λ ε β ρσ =  and  , it ζ  is the error term.  Since  λ β is a product of ε σ  and the 
correlation between the error terms  , it ε  and , it u , the sign is determined byρ .   If the 
characteristics that make firms choose to diversify are positively (negatively) correlated 
with firm value, then both ρ  and λ β are positive (negative).   
  To allow the effects of diversification and firm characteristic to vary by sector we 
modify equation (11) which results in the following Model 3: 
(12)   ,0 1 , ,2 , , ,, it j it it j it it it it EXV Y IND IND X Bλ β ββ λ ζ =+ + + + ,   12
where  12 , and  j j β β now vary by sector and all other parameters are as previously 
specified.  This model treats the decision to diversify as endogenous and allows the 




Data for this study are obtained from the Standard and Poors Compustat Business-
Segment Reports for business segments in the food economy for the 1983 to 2002 time 
period.  The business segment reports contain data on segment sales, assets, and earnings 
before interest and taxes each segment.  We obtain firm level sales for firms that have 
segments in the food economy for the same time period.  To be included in our final 
sample, multi-segment firms must have data available at both the firm and segment 
levels.  This results in a preliminary sample of 4,178 observations that have both segment 
and firm level data.
5  Sales at the firm level are usually completely allocated among the 
reported segments of a diversified firm; however assets are not always completely 
allocated among segments of a diversified firm.  The segment sum of assets is sometimes 
less than the firm figure which results in unallocated assets.  We follow the method used 
by Berger and Ofek to deal with this problem.  If the sum of the segment assets differ 
from the firm reported figure by more than 25% we exclude the observation from our 
analysis.  If the deviation is within 25%, we adjust the imputed value by the percentage 
deviation between the sum of its segment assets and the reported total firm assets.  We 
deal with sum of segment sales as compared to the reported total firm figure in the same 
manner.  This procedure leaves us with a sample of 475 firms with 3,151 observations, of 
which 198 are diversified.  Within the multi-segment observations (diversified firms), 




The excess value measure we calculate using the asset and sales multiplier are reported in 
Table 1.  We find that multi-segment firms have a discount (lower excess firm value) 
relative to single-segment firms with a median discount of 4.2 percent using the asset 
multiplier and 15.8 percent using the sales multiplier.  Berger and Ofek reported median 
discounts of 16.2 percent using asset multiples and 10.6 percent using sales multiples.  
Since our data set is the food economy as compared to the entire economy, the 
diversification in our data is primarily related diversification, which may explain why our 
discount is smaller than that reported by Berger and Ofek.  This is consistent with prior 
research which has shown that related diversification in food firms is positively related to 
stock market evaluation of firm performance (Ding, Caswell, and Zhou).  
  In Table 2 we report median and means excess value by the four major sectors in 
the food economy.  Within each sector, multi-segment firms are larger in terms of 
average assets, market value, and sales.  Additionally, within each sector, the average 
income to sales ratio is higher for multi-segment firms as compared to single-segment 
firms.  For the wholesale, retail, and restaurant sector, the capital expenditures to sales 
ratio is higher for multi-segment firms as compared to single-segment firms.  The 
leverage ratio is higher for multi-segment firms as compared to single-segment firms in 




We estimate three empirical models which correspond to the previously described 




The first model we estimate using OLS correspond to the theoretical model in equation 
(2) and is specified as follows: 
(13)  , 0 11 1, , 12 2, , 13 3, , 2 , , , it it it it it it EXV X X X Y β ββββ η =+ + + + +  
where EXVi,t is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided 
by the sum of the imputed values for each individual business segment.  The independent 




The second model that we estimate, Model II, is consistent with the theoretical model in 
equation (4) and is specified as follows: 
(14) 
, 0 1 , 11 , , 12 , , 13 , ,
21 1, , 22 2, , 23 3, , 24 4, , 25 5, ,
31 1, , , 32 2, , , 33 3, , , 34 4, , , 35 5, , ,
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where t represents years 1984 to 2002.  In this model we use the retail sector as the 
default for all sector binary variables; therefore  1 β  represents the effect of diversification 
on the excess value for retail firms and the sum of the coefficients  11 1 () β β + represents 
the fixed effect of diversification on the excess value of processing firms.  Similarly, the 
coefficient 22 β  measures the effect of profitability on the excess value of retail firms and 
the sum of the coefficients  22 32 () β β +  measures the effect of profitability on the excess 




To model excess value we modify equation (14) by adding the self-selection variable, 
, it λ , and the corresponding parameter, Bλ and estimate using OLS. We calculate 
marginal effects for the probit model for the variables  1, , it x   2, , it x   3, , it x   4, , it x  and  5, , it x  
at mean values for continuous and binary year variables; and sector binary variables set to 
zero.  We also calculate marginal effects for variables  1, , , , it it x PR   2, , , , it it x PR   3, , , , it it x PR  
4, , , , it it x PR  and  5, , , it it x PR at mean values for continuous and year binary variables; sector 
binary variable  , it PR =1; and  , 0 it WH =  and  , 0 it RS = .  Marginal effects for variables 
1, , , , it it x WH   2, , , , it it x WH   3, , , , it it x WH   4, , , , it it x WH   5, , , it it x WH ,  1, , , , it it x RS   2, , , , it it x RS  
3, , , , it it x RS   4, , , , it it x RS  and  5, , , it it x RS  are calculated similarly.  To calculate the marginal 
effect for  , it PR we use the following equation: 
(14) 
** * () () Fx b Fx b − , 
where 
* () Fx b  is the cumulative probability density function evaluated at mean values for 
continuous and year binary variables,  , 0 it PR = ,  , 0 it WH = , and  , 0 it RS = ; and 
** () Fx b  is 
the cumulative probability density function evaluated at mean values for continuous and 
year binary variables,  , 1 it PR = ,  , 0 it WH = , and  , 0 it RS = .  Marginal effects for  , it WH  
and  , it RS are calculated similarly. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Table 4 reports the results of three estimations of excess firm value.  The results and 
discussion are presented for each model. 
   16
Model 1 Results: Benchmark Model with Diversification Measured Exogenously  
 
Model 1, which measures diversification the broadest and is our benchmark measure, is 
estimated using equation (13).  The results indicate that the diversification binary variable 
Yi,t has a negative effect on firm value with an estimate of -0.03 which is smaller in 
absolute value than Berger and Ofek’s estimate of -0.13.  Our lower estimate may be due 
to differences in data sets.  Our data set is the food economy with related diversification 
and a longer time period as compared to Berger and Ofek’s data set which contained 
firms consisting of the entire economy having both unrelated and related diversification 
for years 1986 to 1991.  Parameter estimates for profitability and capital expenditure to 
sales ratio are positive and significant at the 0.001 level of significance.   
  
Model 2 Results: Diversification Measured Exogenously with Firm and Diversification 
Effects Varying by Sector  
 
In table 4, Model 2 is the empirical model that is specified in equation (14).  This model 
allows for both, effects of diversification and firm characteristics, to vary by sector; and 
includes year binary variables.  In this model the effect of diversification on excess firm 
value is -0.20 and significant at the 0.05 level of significance.  This fixed diversification 
effect applies to the retail sector since it is the default.  The processing sector fixed effect 
of diversification is the sum of two parameters  11 1 (β β +  or -0.20 + 0.25) which results in 
a net premium of 0.05.  The restaurant sector also has a net positive fixed effect of 
diversification of 0.23, which is the sum of two parameters  11 3 (β β + or -0.20 and 0.43).  
The effect of the natural log of assets on excess firm value is significantly different for 
retail and processing firms with effects of -0.22 and -0.13  21 31 (β β +  or -0.22 + 0.09), 
respectively.     17
In all sectors, the elasticity of excess value with respect to assets (rather than the 
natural log of assets) is negative with estimates of -0.1761, -0.1053, -0.1785 and -0.1763 
for the retail, processing, wholesale and restaurant sectors, respectively.  The results 
indicate that the effects of profitability for the processing, wholesale, and restaurant 
sectors are significantly different than the retail sector.  Within the retail sector, 
profitability has a large positive effect on excess value with an estimate of 10.26 as 
compared to the net effect of 1.18, 0.60, and 2.39 for the processing, wholesale, and 
restaurant sectors, respectively.   
 
Model 3 Results: Diversification Measured Endogenously with Firm and Diversification 
Effects Varying by Sector  
 
Table 5 reports results for the first stage of the self-selection model.  The independent 
variables included in Model 2 are included in the first stage of Model 3, except now the 
binary diversification variable, Yi,t is the independent variable.  We report the marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables in addition to the parameter estimates and standard 
errors.  The processing and restaurant sector binary variables are found to be significant 
in the decision to diversify.  Firms in the processing sector are more likely to diversify 
than firms in the retail or restaurant sectors.  Restaurant firms are less likely to diversify 
than firms in the retail sector.   
We also calculate the marginal effect of a one unit change in assets (rather than a 
one unit change in the natural log of assets) on the decision to diversify at mean values 
for explanatory variables.  It is estimated that an increase in assets by one million dollars 
increases the probability of diversification by 0.01, 0.04, and 0.21 for firms in the retail, 
wholesale, and restaurant sectors, respectively.  In contrast, an increase in assets by one   18
million dollars has a negative effect of -0.01 on the probability of diversification for 
processing firms.  Fifteen out of the nineteen year binary variables are found to be 
significant at 0.10 or less, suggesting that macroeconomic conditions have an impact on a 
firm’s decision to diversify. 
  The results from the second stage of the self-selection model are reported in table 
4.  Similar to Campa and Kedia, we find a diversification premium when modeling the 
decision to diversify as endogenous.  Our results indicate that a firm’s decision to 
diversify and excess firm value are negatively correlated with an estimate of -0.33 forBλ .  
With the retail sector as the default, the effect of diversification on excess value is 
estimated to be 0.47, which is contrasting to the Model 2 estimate of -0.20.  The fixed 
effects of diversification for the processing and wholesale sectors are not found to be 
significantly different than the retail sector.  However, the fixed effect of diversification 
in the restaurant sector is found to be significantly larger than the retail sector.   
Similar to Model 2, the effect of profitability on excess value in the retail sector is 
larger compared to the other three sectors.  The effect of earnings before interest and 
taxes on excess value in the retail, processing, wholesale, and restaurant sectors are 
estimated to be 10.28, 1.20, 0.59, and 2.39, respectively, which are similar to the 
estimates in Model 2.  The capital expenditures to sales ratio and leverage have 
significant negative effects on excess value with estimates of -0.50, and -0.05, 
respectively.  The effect of capital expenditures on excess value is significantly different 
in the restaurant sector as compared to the retail sector with a positive effect of 1.64.  
Effects of leverage in the wholesale and restaurant sectors are found to be significantly   19
different than the retail sector estimate of -0.05, with estimates of 0.20 and 0.19, 
respectively.   
When comparing the results between Model 2 and Model 3, the Self-selection 
model, the estimates are quantitatively similar, except for the diversification effects.  In 
the Self-selection model the diversification effects are positive with estimates of 0.47, 
0.69, 0.26, and 0.89 for the retail, processing, wholesale, and restaurant sectors, 
respectively.  In Model 2, these were negative for the retail and wholesale sectors.  Since 
the estimate for Bλ is found to be significant at the 0.001 level, we conclude that the 
related diversification in the food economy that we observe in our data has a positive 




Consistent with the general consensus of prior research, we find that firms in the 
food economy choose to diversify and related diversification enhances firm value.  
Besanko et al. noted that firms who diversify according to a core set of resources and 
integrate the business that is being acquired tend to outperform firms that are not able to 
achieve these synergies between diversified businesses units. This suggests that these 
successful firms are able to achieve economies of scope which allow them to reduce 
transactions costs and make it efficient to organize diverse business units within one 
business.  This could be the rationale for the various acquisitions carried out by Unilver 
(acquisition of Slim-Fast, Bestfoods, and Ben and Jerry’s), Pepsico (acquisition of 
Quaker Oats), General Mills (acquisition of Pillsbury), and other similar firms in the food 
economy.  The reduction of transactions costs through diversification suggests that these 
diversified firms may be more profitable than single industry firms. Future research on   20
the food economy should include further analysis of firms that are able to repeat their 
performance over time to determine whether diversification remains profitable in the 
long-run.   
Processing firms are most likely to diversify which suggests greater opportunities 
for economies of scope or scale.  The processing sector had the greatest amount of assets 
per firm and large and persistent sector effects which may suggest greater economies of 
size as well. Restaurants firms were least likely to diversify.  This sector had the greatest 
amount of entry and exit, fewer assets, and the lowest profits relative to the other three 
sectors in the food economy.   
The amount of leverage (debt-to-asset ratio) has a negative effect on excess value 
in the retail sector suggesting that increased amount of debt results in negative excess 
value.  This finding was positive for the wholesale and restaurant sectors.  The retail 
sector has more leverage, assets, and sales relative to the other three sectors which 
suggest that this sector has unique characteristics. Thus, it is important to look at 
individual sectors within the entire economy when evaluating the impact of 
diversification rather than aggregated sectors in an economy. Industry characteristics 
such as asset size and barriers to entry may influence whether firms in that industry 
choose to diversify. 
There are also important implications regarding public policy for firms interested 
in diversifying laterally into related food industries or vertically up and down the food 
chain.  If the market perceives diversified firms as a greater value, then there may be 
potential benefits associated with consolidation and merger activities in the food 
economy.  Lastly, this research provides information for scholars in the area of the food   21
economy and management strategy.  The results from this study suggest that 
diversification in the food and agribusiness sectors contributes to positive excess firm 
value, which is relevant information to scholars and students who are interested in careers 
in these sectors.  22
Footnotes 
1 The performance of firms in the food economy are of great interest to policy makers and 
researchers. For example, Congress appropriated several million dollars in recent years to 
study various aspects of the food economy.  Examples of this include research at Iowa 
State University (Food Chain Economic Analysis), the University of Connecticut (Food 
Marketing Policy Center), the University of Wisconsin (Food Systems Research Group), 
and the Agricultural Marketing Resource Center (Iowa State University, Kansas State 
University, and University of California).  Similarly, the Sloan Foundation funded the 
Food Industry Center at the University of Minnesota to study the retail grocery sector. 
 
2We refer to these four industries as processing, wholesaling, retail, and restaurant 
throughout the paper. 
 
3 For example, Nestle’s corporate data is reported in SIC 2000 Food and Kindred 
Products.  Its business segment data are reported in SIC 2023 Dry, Condensed and 
Evaporated Milk Products (called Milk Products by Nestle); SIC 2038 Frozen Specialties 
(called Prepared Dishes and Cooking Aids); SIC 2066 Chocolate and Cocoa Products 
(called Chocolate and Confectionary); and SIC 2095 Roasted Coffee (called Beverages). 
Thus, Nestle operates in the processing sector (SIC 20) and has business segments within 
four industries (SIC 2023, SIC 2038, SIC 2066, and SIC 2095). 
 
4Further explanation and derivation of Heckman’s model can be found in Greene and 
Maddala.  Both provide an empirical model using Heckman’s two-step estimation 
procedure. 
  
5 Berger and Ofek’s data consisted of all industries except for the financial services 
industry.  They eliminated observations with sales or assets near zero and any firm with 
sales less than 2 million.     23
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Excess Value Asset Multiplier     
  Single-segment firms  0.0149 0.0000  0.5640
  Multi-segment firms  -0.0094 -0.0422  0.5681
Excess Value Sales Multiplier     
  Single-segment firms  -0.0369 0.0000  0.6907
  Multi-segment firms  -0.3005 -.01582  1.0799
Number of segments   
  Single-segment firms  1.0000 1.0000  0.0000
  Multi-segment firms  2.1700 2.0000  0.5013
Natural log of total assets   
  Single-segment firms  4.9191 4.8889  2.2158
  Multi-segment firms  7.0224 7.4760  1.9711
Income to sales Ratio   
  Single-segment firms  0.0456 0.0492  0.0913
  Multi-segment firms  0.0602 0.0433  0.0617
Capital expenditures to sales ratio   
  Single-segment firms  0.0757 0.0458  0.0972
  Multi-segment firms  0.0482 0.0375  0.0482
Leverage Ratio   
  Single-segment firms  0.2897 0.2568  0.2435
  Multi-segment firms  0.3377 0.3164  0.1838
Natural log of total assets squared   
  Single-segment firms  29.1057 23.9018  23.0612
  Multi-segment firms  53.1799 55.8906  25.4650
Market Value (millions)   
  Single-segment firms  1,710.41 84.44  8,364.03
  Multi-segment firms  5,139.94 890.07  10,462.17
Sales (millions)   
  Single-segment firms  1,968.89 218.69  5,421.63
  Multi-segment firms  6,826.88 3,486.10  8,075.77  27
Table 2.  Median and Means for the Four Sectors in the Food Economy by 
Diversification Profile 
 Processing Wholesale  Retail  Restaurant
Medians     
Excess Value using Asset Multiplier     
  Single-segment firms  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000
  Multi-segment firms  -0.0071 -0.2777 -0.0612  0.2615
Excess Value using Sales Multiplier   
  Single-segment firms  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000
  Multi-segment firms  -0.0391 -0.5064 -0.1729  0.1932
Means     
Excess Value using Asset Multiplier     
  Single-segment firms  -0.0068 -0.1283 0.0635  0.0447
  Multi-segment firms  0.1202 -0.3171 -0.0144  0.1645
Excess Value using Sales Multiplier     
  Single-segment firms  -0.0560 -0.2513 -0.0503  0.0248
  Multi-segment firms  0.0345 -1.0798 -.03219  0.1123
Number of observations   
  Single-segment firms  1292 169 414  1078
  Multi-segment firms  88 53 28  29
Natural log of total assets   
  Single-segment firms  5.2611 4.3495 6.3171  4.0617
  Multi-segment firms  7.4387 7.1110 7.3028  5.3268
Income to sales Ratio   
  Single-segment firms  0.0661 -0.0077 0.0255  0.0370
  Multi-segment firms  0.0911 0.0239 0.0284  0.0635
Capital expenditures to sales ratio   
  Single-segment firms  0.0652 0.0368 0.0360  0.1097
  Multi-segment firms  0.0658 0.0146 0.0327  0.0711
Leverage Ratio   
  Single-segment firms  0.2595 0.2846 0.3382  0.3079
  Multi-segment firms  0.3189 0.3662 0.4219  0.2613
Natural log of total assets
2   
  Single-segment firms  32.7743 24.4189 42.5190  20.2922
  Multi-segment firms  61.0950 52.0405 55.3849  29.1154
Market Value (millions)   
  Single-segment firms  2,850.70 814.84 1,651.50  542.92
  Multi-segment firms  9,545.63 1,169.50 3,728.51  390.07
Sales (millions)   
  Single-segment firms  2,170.26 2,148.97 5,203.80  456.98
  Multi-segment firms  7,300.98 7,675.85 10,300.53  482.83
   28
Table 3.  Definition of Variables used in the Three Empirical Models  
Variable Definition 
EXVi,t  The sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt 
/sum of the imputed value for each individual business segment 
Yi,t  Binary variable =1 if firm i in year t is diversified  
PRi,t
a  Binary variable =1 if firm i in year t is in the processing sector 
WHi,t
a  Binary variable =1 if firm i in year t is in the wholesale sector 
RSi,t
a  Binary variable =1 if firm i in year t is in the restaurant sector 
X1,i,t  The natural log of assets of firm i in year t 
X2,i,t  Earnings before interest and taxes/Sales of firm i in year t 
X3,i,t  Capital expenditures/Sales of firm i in year t 
X4,i,t  Total Debt/Assets of firm i in year t 
X5,i,t  Natural log of assets squared of firm i in year t 
Y84i,t   Binary variable =1 if firm i is in year 84.   
Y85i,t- Y02i,t  Year binary variables that can be similarly interpreted as above. 
aDiviersified firms are assigned to the sector which has the largest portion of sales.    29
  
 
Table 4.  Parameter Estimates for the Three Models with Excess Value as the Dependent 
Variable 
 Parameter  Estimates 
Variable  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3
b  
Intercept -0.1311 
***  0.2359 
***  0.2639 
*** 
 (0.0264) 
  (0.0596) 
  (0.0619) 
 
Yi,t  -0.0294 
  -0.2009 
**  0.4689 
*** 
  (0.0412) 
  (0.1031) 
  (0.0277) 
 
PRi,t   
  0.2469 
**  0.2166 
 
  
  (0.1193) 
  (0.7998) 
 
WHi,t   
  -0.0692 
  -0.2083 
 
  
  (0.1410) 
  (0.1318) 
 
RSi,   
  0.4313 
***  0.4173 
*** 
  
  (0.1430) 
  (0.0031) 
 
X1,i,t  0.0048 
  -0.2241 
***  -0.2157 
 
  (0.0049) 
  (0.0268) 
  (1.2530) 
 
X2,i,t  1.2660 
***  10.2551 
***  10.2820 
*** 
  (0.1207) 
  (1.2175) 
  (0.7786) 
 
X3,i,t  0.8533 
***  -0.6845 
  -0.5019 
*** 
  (0.1031) 
  (0.7547) 
  (0.1093) 
 
X4,i,t     -0.0119 
  -0.0503 
* 
     (0.1056) 
  (0.0268) 
 
X5,i,t     0.0240 
***  0.0222 
 
     (0.0029) 
  (1.2652) 
 
X1,i,t PRi,t     0.0944 
***  0.1050 
** 
     (0.0259) 
  (0.0445) 
 
X2,i,t PRi,t     -9.0794 
***  -9.0834 
*** 
     (1.2294) 
  (1.3150) 
 
X3,i,t PRi,t     1.0029 
  0.7582 
 
     (0.7738) 
  (0.8718) 
 
X4,i,t PRi,t     -0.1903 
  -0.1990 
 
     (0.1281) 
  (0.2064) 
 
X5,i,t PRi,t     -0.0118 
***  -0.0133 
** 
     (0.0030) 
  (0.0059) 
 
X1,i,t WHi,t     -0.0008 
  0.0212 
 
     (0.0428) 
  (0.0288) 
 
X2,i,t WHi,t     -9.6539 
***  -9.6878 
*** 
     (1.2778) 
  (1.2688) 
 
X3,i,t WHi,t     0.3592 
  0.1982 
 
     (0.8460) 
  (0.7901) 
 
X4,i,t WHi,t     0.2918 
  0.2544 
** 
     (0.2004) 
  (0.1240) 
 
X5,i,t WHi,t     -0.0008 
  -0.0069 
* 
     (0.0054) 
  (0.0036) 
   30
X1,i,t RSi,     0.0114 
  -0.0043 
 
     (0.0277) 
  (0.0751) 
 
X2,i,t RSi,     -7.8674 
***  -7.8905 
*** 
     (1.2329)    (0.0737)   
X3,i,t RSi,     2.2405 
***  2.1380 
*** 
     (0.7673)    (0.0705)   
X4,i,t RSi,     0.1757 
  0.2359 
*** 
     (0.1192) 
  (0.0692) 
 
X5,i,t RSi,     -0.0058 
*  -0.0036 
 
     (0.0034) 
  (0.0685) 
 
, it λ       
  -0.3303 
*** 
      
  (0.1031) 
 
            
Adjusted R
2 0.0667   0.1608    0.1633   
F-Statistic 56.24    14.18    10.32   
Notes:  Number of observations:  3051.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at , 
** significant at 0.05, 
*** significant at 0.001. 
aYear effects are included in the OLS model and are not reported.  None of the year 
effects are significant at 0.10 or less. 
bYear effects are included in the 2nd step of the self-selection model and are not reported.  
Fifteen out of the 19 year binary variables are significant at 0.10 or less.   31








***  0.5572  
PRi,t  0.9250 
*  0.5743 0.2545 
WHi,t  -1.0869 
  1.4776 -0.0011 
RSi,  -5.8197 
***  2.0667 -0.0622 
X1,i,t  0.1932 
***  0.0707 0.0138 
X2,i,t  -0.1550 
  5.4949 -0.0029 
X3,i,t  -5.2660 
  5.1314 -0.1746 
X4,i,t  0.3829 
  0.3706 0.0125 
X5,i,t  -0.0163 
  0.0401 -0.0005 
X1,i,t PRi,t  -0.4665 
***  0.1304 -0.0476 
X2,i,t PRi,t  -0.0481 
  5.5555 -0.0081 
X3,i,t PRi,t  6.0326 
  5.1801 0.4171 
X4,i,t PRi,t  0.3844 
  0.4881 0.0268 
X5,i,t PRi,t  0.0399 
***  0.0088 0.0039 
X1,i,t WHi,t  0.3945 
  0.4704 0.0215 
X2,i,t WHi,t  -0.8090 
  6.2774 -0.1099 
X3,i,t WHi,t  -3.4048 
  12.2215 -0.4258 
X4,i,t WHi,t  0.6129 
  0.7147 0.0771 
X5,i,t WHi,t  0.0121 
  0.0386 0.0005 
X1,i,t RSi,  2.6834 
***  0.7951 0.0205 
X2,i,t RSi,  0.7287 
  5.7545 0.0055 
X3,i,t RSi,  -2.5752 
  5.6400 -0.0214 
X4,i,t RSi,  -1.0198 
*  0.5381 -0.0084 
X5,i,t RSi,  -0.2582 
***  0.0756 -0.0020 
Notes:  Number of observations:  3051.  
*Significant at 0.10, 
** significant at 0.05, 
*** 
significant at 0.001.  Year effects are included in the 1st step of the self-selection model 
and are not reported.  Fifteen out of the 19 year binary variables are significant at 0.10 or 
less. 
 
 